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Against Anti-Beneficent Paternalism

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In a previous post, I argued that "undue inducement" worries are typically deeply misguided, and that banning good compensation is contrary to the interests of the very people that it's intended to help.  In this post, I want to raise a different objection: that even if allowing and/or incentivizing beneficent actions (such as kidney donation, or challenge trial participation) would "induce" some people to perform beneficent acts that they might later regret (or that they wouldn't have agreed to if thinking more clearly), it may nonetheless be the case that banning this would be morally even worse.First: I grant that it is absolutely a pro-tanto moral cost if someone makes a personally-regrettable decision.  But a question that is rarely asked is: how great of a moral cost is this?  How does it compare to the moral costs of status-quo harms (e.g. people dying for lack of a kidney transplant, or lack of a promptly-developed Covid vaccine) that are relieved by the transaction, or even just the costs to other participants who truly wish to participate (some of whom may benefit greatly from being well-compensated)?As a general rule, it seems to me that we should not intervene to prevent people from performing beneficent acts (acts that help others more than they harm the agent themselves).  Reasonable people can dispute the conditions under which individuals might be forced to sacrifice their own interests to better promote the general good. But this alternative view, that individuals might be forced, for their own good, not to promote the general good, strikes me as entirely unreasonable.  No sane person should have opposed Covid challenge trials out of concern for the participants, for example.  We should all recognize that such a position is morally outrageous.What about concerns regarding imperfect consent?  I agree that it would be wrong to deliberately misinform or mislead individuals into "consenting" to. . .

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