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The Parochialism of Metaethical Naturalism

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I've previously suggested that naturalism can't account for substantive boundary disputes (and I mean to turn that into a proper paper sometime soon).  But as I've been working on my Moral 2-Dism paper I've found another sense in which metaethical naturalism entails a troubling kind of parochialism.  It's this: to avoid the Open Question Argument, naturalists now hold that there is an a posteriori identity between certain moral and natural properties (on the model of water and H2O).  This entails that moral terms are 2-D asymmetric, i.e. have differing primary and secondary intensions.  This in turn means that what our moral terms pick out at a world may differ depending on whether we consider the world 'as actual' or 'as counterfactual'. But this is objectionably parochial: (our assessments of) the moral facts should not differ depending on our location in modal space.Compare 'water'.  On Twin Earth, the watery stuff is something other than H2O.  Given that our watery stuff is H2O, we judge that Twin Earth lacks water.  But suppose an oracle informs you that you've been deceived: actually you've been on Twin Earth all along, and the actual watery stuff of your acquaintance has never been composed of H2O.  You'll now reconsider, and judge that Twin Earth (but not H2O-Earth) has water. Our 'water'-judgments are, in this way, "parochial": they depend upon our (historical) location in modal space.  We may need to revise them upon revising our beliefs about which possible world is actual.  And that seems fine for the term 'water'.  Natural kind terms are inherently parochial, insofar as they're about those kinds of things we found around here.Ethics should not be so parochial. In principle, we can assess the normative truths Ni that apply to any given possible world Wi: "If Wi, then Ni."  Such conditional normative judgments must be a priori if knowable at all: they should not suddenly jump. . .

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