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Adams' Critique of Global Consequentialism

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From p.479 of 'Motive Utilitarianism':The moral point of view—the point of view from which moral judgments are made—cannot safely be defined as a point of view in which the test of utility is applied directly to all objects of moral evaluation. For it is doubtful that the most useful motives, and the most useful sort of conscience, are related to the most useful acts in the way that the motives, and especially the kind of conscience, regarded as right must be related to the acts regarded as right in anything that is to count as a morality. And therefore it is doubtful that direct application of the test of utility to everything results in a system that counts as a morality.How must the right motives be related to the right acts?  Plausibly through a principle that links normative and motivating reasons: an agent acts from the "right reasons" when their motivating reasons are the very normative reasons that make the act worth doing.  Something along those lines.Adams is right that this plausible principle is incompatible with Global Consequentialism.  GC-ists must instead embrace a radical disharmony between reasons and motives, of the sort that Stocker powerfully criticized in 'The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories'.  That gives us reason to reject GC.Curiously, Adams is more sympathetic to the direct application of utilitarian evaluation to motives than to actions.  This strikes me as exactly backwards.  However distasteful one might find some of Act Utilitarianism's implications, it could hardly be denied that one has strong moral reasons to perform the action that does the most good.  It is far less clear, by contrast, that utility-promoting motives are always rationally supported in this way.  Wanting the most useful motives, and acting to inculcate them, may of course be straightforwardly justified on utilitarian grounds.  But that's different from holding the motives themselves (which might have. . .

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