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Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The Argument From Analogy

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2020.06.34 : View this Review Online | View Recent NDPR Reviews Christopher Cowie, Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The Argument From Analogy, Oxford University Press, 2020, 240pp., $60.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780198842736. Reviewed by Terence Cuneo, University of Vermont, and Spencer Case, Wuhan University According to moral error theory, moral judgments attempt to describe a reality that doesn't exist. Unsettling though error theory is, some philosophers find the arguments for it compelling. Christopher Cowie's book contributes to the growing literature on moral error theory by offering a sustained defense of it from a prominent objection. The objection, which Cowie calls the argument from analogy with epistemic judgment (henceforth, the "analogy argument"), runs roughly as follows. Given the parallels between the moral and epistemic domains, if there were sound arguments for moral error theory, then there would also be sound arguments for epistemic error theory. But epistemic error theory implies radical skepticism: there is no epistemic reason to accept anything, including moral error theory itself. Given... Read More

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News source: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // News

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