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Consequentialism, Moral Worth, and the Fitting/Fortunate Distinction

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In 'Consequentialism and Moral Worth' (forthcoming in Utilitas), Nathaniel Sharadin discusses the idea that acts done for the "right reason" have a special normative status (moral worth / praiseworthiness).  The "right reasons" here are usually assumed to be the right-making reasons, but Sharadin argues that consequentialists should reject this assumption, and instead consider the "right reasons" to be whatever motivations would be best to have (and hence are recommended by the theory).  This strikes me as deeply confused, neglecting the distinction between fitting and fortunate character.  As I put it in my recent paper on right-makers:An agent may ask, “What motivational profile would it be best or most desirable, from a moral perspective, for me to have?” I take this to be the question implicitly driving the motive utilitarian (or the global consequentialist thinking about motives). This is to ask about the morally recommended or fortunate motivational. . .

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