In the previous essay I drew an analogy between the ethics of abortion and the ethics of migration. In this essay, I will develop the analogy more and do so with a focus on the logic of the analogy. Because everyone loves logic. Image Credit Strictly presented, an analogical argument will have three premises and a conclusion. The first two premises (attempt to) establish the analogy by showing that the things in question are similar in certain respects.  The third premise establishes the additional fact known about one thing and the conclusion asserts that because the two things are alike in other respects, they are alike in this additional respect. Here is the form of the argument: Premise 1: X has properties P, Q, and R.Premise 2: Y has properties P, Q, and R.Premise 3: X has property Z as well.Conclusion: Y has property Z X and Y are variables that stand for whatever is being compared, such as rats and humans or Hitler and that politician you hate. P, Q, R, and Z are also variables, but they stand for properties or qualities, such as having a heart. The use of P, Q, and R is just for the sake of the illustration-the things being compared might have many more properties in common. It is easy to make a moral argument using an argument from analogy. To argue that Y is morally wrong, find an X that is already accepted as being wrong and show how Y is like X. To argue that Y is morally good, find an X that is already accepted as morally good and show how Y is like X. To be a bit more formal, here is how the argument would look: Premise 1: X has properties P, Q, and R.Premise 2: Y has properties P, Q, and R. Premise 3: X is morally good (or morally wrong). Conclusion: Y is morally good (or morally wrong). The strength of an analogical argument depends on three factors. To the degree that an analogical argument meets these standards it is a strong argument. If an it fails to meet these standards, then it is weak. If it is weak enough, then it. . .

“Is there anything wrong with publishing philosophical work which one does not believe?” That is the central question of “Publishing Without Belief,” a recent article in Analysis by Alexandra Plakias, assistant professor of philosophy at Hamilton College. Salvador Dalí, detail of “The Madonna of Port Lligat” (1950) Professor Plakias argues that publishing without belief is not wrong: “the practice isn’t intrinsically wrong, nor is there a compelling consequentialist argument against it.” Here are some of the reasons she offers for her answer: “requiring philosophers to publish only what is true, or what they know, advantages philosophers with more permissive standards for knowledge or truth, while disadvantaging those with higher standards.” “biographical information about the author—including his or her personal convictions—should be… irrelevant to assessments of the merits of their argument… we don’t necessarily base our acceptance of an argument on the speaker’s (or author’s) attitude towards it.” Publishing without belief doesn’t necessarily involve hypocrisy, lack of thoroughness, or insouciance (bullshitting). “The speaker (or writer) who doesn’t believe her argument isn’t telling her audience that she believes what she’s saying—she’s asking the audience to believe it.” We don’t have sufficient reasons to think that “a philosopher won’t whole-heartedly defend a view she’s put into print, even if she isn’t convinced of its truth.” “Securing academic employment depends on publishing, usually in a peer-reviewed journal… Suppose, as seems plausible, the position defended in a paper has a bearing on how likely that paper is to be accepted for publication. And suppose the views we end up believing are, in part, beyond our control. I submit that we should do our best to minimize the extent to which the ability to have. . .

Soohyun Ahn is a PhD candidate in Philosophy at the University of Calgary, working in the philosophy of science under Dr. Marc Ereshefsky. Her research is ... Read more...

In 2001, John J. Lennon killed a rival drug dealer. Eighteen years of incarceration later, he reflects on the trials of literary life behind bars

2019.07.07 : View this Review Online | View Recent NDPR Reviews Karen Jones and François Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms, Oxford University Press, 2018, 309pp., $70.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780198797074. Reviewed by Nin Kirkham, The University of Western Australia When reading Hume's spirited articulation of moral sentimentalism and his powerful empiricist critique of just about everything awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumbers and prompted him, among other things, to produce the Groundwork, little did he know that he would be responsible for what would turn out to be the most influential version of one side of a metaethical debate that has now raged for centuries. This book is the latest instalment, devoted to showcasing a range of contemporary positions and controversies within the rationalist tradition, broadly understood. The collection is comprised of fourteen essays (including the introduction), which are organised into three sections: "Normativity"; "Epistemology and Meaning"; and "Psychology". Each section contains rather a diverse smorgasbord of views. In the... Read More

Patrick Fontana is a french artist. He takes notes dessinées (notes drawn) from philosophical seminars, books, to produce visual and sound digital installations, performance videos, ... Read more...

U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo earlier this week announced the creation of a new “Commission on Unalienable Rights,” comprised of scholars and activists interested in various dimensions of human rights, law, and religion, to provide him with “advice on human rights grounded in our nation’s founding principles and the principles of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo announces new Commission on Unalienable Rights Among the dozen individuals named as members of the committee is University of South Carolina Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Department of Philosophy Chair Christopher Tollefsen. The commission will be led by Mary Ann Glendon (Harvard Law) and also includes Russell Berman (Stanford, Hoover Institution), Peter Berkowitz (Hoover Institution), Paolo Carozza (Notre Dame Law and Political Science), Hamza Yusuf Hanson (Zaytuna College), Jacqueline Rivers (Seymour Institute), Meir Soloveichik (Rabbi, Congregation Shearith Israel), Kiron Skinner (State Dept.), Katrina Lantos Swett (Lantos Foundation), David Tse-Chien Pan (UC Irvine), and Cartright Weiland (State Dept.). Pompeo said: I hope that the commission will revisit the most basic of questions: What does it mean to say or claim that something is, in fact, a human right? How do we know or how do we determine whether that claim that this or that is a human right, is it true, and therefore, ought it to be honored? How can there be human rights, rights we possess not as privileges we are granted or even earn, but simply by virtue of our humanity belong to us? Is it, in fact, true, as our Declaration of Independence asserts, that as human beings, we—all of us, every member of our human family—are endowed by our creator with certain unalienable rights? Each of these is an important question, and the mission of the commission is to provide advice on them and others not as purely abstract academic matters, but. . .

It's interesting to compare the ways we talk and think about political vs non-political (civic/philanthropic or market) agents, advocacy, and organization.  Consider the common objection to Effective Altruism, that it allegedly "neglects the need for systemic change."  I've rebutted this objection before, but a different aspect of it that I want to focus on today is that the criticism seems to presuppose that only politics can be systemic.  But why assume that?EAs advocate that everyone donate at least 10% of their incomes to effective causes.  If that happened, the world would be radically transformed: ending extreme poverty, material deprivation, and easily preventable disease, forever.  So if that's not a "systemic change", I don't know what is.  Admittedly, what we're calling for (in the first instance) is change to the behaviour of agents in the system, rather than changes to the rules of the system.  But changing the rules also requires behaviour (just of a political sort), so it's not entirely clear what the basis is for seeing any deep distinction or disagreement here.Perhaps the thought is that the sort of 'systemic change' constituted by universal acceptance of Effective Altruism is just too unrealistic.  That might seem an odd criticism for political radicals (of all people) to make, but it's certainly more probable that (enough) people change their political behaviour to elect a radical leftist than that a comparable number of people change their non-political behaviour to be radically more altruistic.  Voting and political talk is cheap compared to funding your values, after all, and people are lamentably selfish.I think this is an important insight.  Altruistic political expression is easier to secure than altruistic (non-political) behaviour, so we should use the former to force the latter, e.g. by redistributive taxation. I've long supported universal basic income for. . .

So photos of meals on Instagram are nothing but food porn? Let's not be so cynical. What if those pictures are a new incarnation of an ancient instinct: prayer?

Knowledge resistance is “the tendency not to accept available knowledge”, according to the mission statement of the interdisciplinary project “Knowledge Resistance: Causes, Consequences and Cures,” which was awarded a $5.6 million grant from the Swedish Foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences in October 2018. Åsa Wikforss is the project leader. A professor of theoretical philosophy at Stockholm University, she is also a newly-elected member – and the only philosopher – of the Swedish Academy, a prestigious cultural institution of 18 members appointed for life. In an age of misinformation both online and off, researching knowledge resistance could not be more timely. When senior politicians announce that the people have had enough of experts, it’s not long before a race to the bottom begins, where dangerous myths and misinformation can entrench themselves. In this interview, we discuss how knowledge resistance manifests itself in popular movements such as anti-vaxxers and climate ...