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The Irrational Faith–Proof, Intuitions, and Religious Belief

“You talk to God, you're religious. God talks to you, you're psychotic.” – Doris Egan

William Lane Craig, popular Christian apologist who has debated almost every prominent atheist and agnostic alive, closed his opening statement in his debate with Oxford professor Peter Atkins with an existential claim. After spending 20 minutes giving rational proofs for God’s existence, he offers a final option if the proofs weren’t convincing.

“The immediate experience of God. This isn’t really an argument for God’s existence. Rather, it’s the claim that you can know that God exists wholly apart from argument simply by immediately experiencing Him. This was the way people in the Bible knew God. As professor John Hick explains, “To them, God was not an idea adopted by the mind but an experiential reality which gave significance to their lives.” Now if this is so then there’s a danger that proofs for God could actually distract your attention from God Himself. If you’re sincerely seeking God, then God will make his existence evident to you. . . . We mustn’t so concentrate on the external proofs that we fail to hear the inner voice of God speaking to our own hearts. For those who listen, God becomes and immediate reality in their lives.” (The Craig-Atkins Debate)

In his book Reasonable Apologetics, Craig appears to take an even harder existentialist line claiming that it is the “Holy Spirit who gives us ultimate assurance of Christianity’s truth” and “reason does not serve as a basis for [the Christian’s] belief.” But he quickly attenuates his view and for those that might claim that reason plays no role, Craig chides, “this attitude is unbalanced and unbiblical” and then spends the majority of his 300 pages providing rational arguments for Christianity and God’s existence.(Craig, 1994)

William_Lane_CraigIn a previous essay, I began looking at the religious existentialism of the philosopher Søren Kierkegaard. As we saw there, Kierkegaard would not agree with Craig’s assessment. Kierkegaard’s position is that belief about the existence of God which is based on argument is not belief about any real god. The true Christian is the one that comes to God in “the way people in the Bible knew God,” through a personal, existential encounter. The true God cannot be the conclusion of a syllogism. Yet the both/and approach that Craig calls for typifies the religious epistemology of many Christian believers and the popularity of books and websites on Christian apologetics is at least anecdotal evidence of the desire on the part of believers both that their faith be seen as rational and that they have rational grounds for believing. Can the believer have it both ways?Peter_Atkins

Craig (rightly in my opinion) makes a distinction between belief formed by way of “external” proofs and belief formed by way of direct experience. For Kierkegaard, these two ways are not mutually supporting or compatible when it comes to religion because the object of belief formed by each way is unique. Beliefs arrived at by way of rational evidence have as their object a proposition—an idea. Beliefs formed existentially have as their object the reality the belief is about. Since God is not a proposition but a person, it is not possible to form belief in God by way of reason and actually believe in God qua being. Paul Moser captures this distinction as follows, “If faith that God exists is just belief that God exists, it is merely a psychological attitude towards a judgment or proposition. That is, it is simply de dicto, related to a propositional dictum: to the statement that God exists. In contrast, faith in God is best understood as having a de re component (specifically, involving a relation to something agent-like) that is irreducible to a judgment or proposition. In particular, faith in God relates one to God, and not just to a judgment or proposition about God.” (Moser, 2010) It is similar to a distinction between believing propositions about love and being in love. A woman standing at the altar may take issue if her would-be spouse chose to change the marriage vow to, “Do you promise to fervently believe propositions about love, honoring and cherishing with regards to [fiancée] as long as you both shall live?”

But perhaps this is too rigid a dichotomy. It seems one could encounter a person and have an existential relationship with them but also believe true propositions about them. After all, I know my wife existentially in every way that would satisfy Kierkegaard but I also believe a great number of propositions about her. I know her height, her eye color, her hair color, her movie preferences, how many kids she has, the names of her siblings and the like (I have no idea how much she weighs and she has promised me I’ll never know that fact). The latter beliefs may in some way be based on the former but it certainly seems possible for me to know those facts propositionally while at the same time having a fully existential relationship with her. In fact, many propositional truths are like this. I see (or believe I see) a red object before me and then come to believe the proposition, there is a red object before me. I could then offer evidence and arguments that ground belief in the proposition even though my belief in the red object isn’t grounded on them. Couldn’t religious belief function much like this? One comes to believe in God existentially by directly experiencing him. Then, that belief is supported by a number of rational arguments and physical evidence that essentially provide her with propositional truth about Him.

Moser parts company with Kierkegaard on precisely this point. For Moser, faith is not opposed to reason because an existential commitment can (he argues must) be supported by evidence. He writes,

"In fact, faith in God should be grounded in trustworthy supporting evidence of that distinctive kind in order to avoid becoming just wishful thinking, misleading dogmatism, distorting bias, or some other kind of cognitively arbitrary commitment. Cognitive arbitrariness is harmful in this connection because it leaves faith as unguided by a trustworthy indication of what is true and therefore as a prime candidate for a species of distorting bias or misleading dogmatism. Fideism1 [an epistemic category into which he places Kierkegaard] about faith in God, we shall see, suffers from the deficiency of failing to protect against this serious problem."

"Faith in God therefore should not be characterized as an inward embracing of contradictory or absurdity, because that approach to faith undermines the import and need for supporting evidence of the truth of any proposition accepted and faith.”

He later remarks,

"The receptive feature of faith in God, toward an experienced divine call, arguably excludes a characterization of such faith in terms of pure imagination or wishful thinking, and points instead to a kind of experiential cognitive support. This lesson, if secured, counts directly against fideism, because the lesson portrays faith in God as being responsive to a kind of intervention in human experience that can, and arguably sometimes does, qualify as trustworthy evidence. Exactly what such evidence is evidence of will be, of course, a matter of dispute among philosophers, as pretty much everything else is. Even so, we have a basis for contrasting faith in God with and constraint fantasy or guesswork, and for finding a trustworthy ground for faith in God and the thing(s) two which such faith as a response. This consideration merits our attention as a warning against inflating faith in God with mere belief that God exists. In addition it counts against any kind of fideism (familiar from Kierkegaard, Bultmann, and Barth) that portrays faith in God as irreconcilable with supporting evidence." (Moser, 2010)

To reject evidence for belief in God and view faith, as Kierkegaard does, as absurd is to make faith tangential to the rightly ordered mind. It is to view faith as being in a distinct cognitive category that threatens to lead to distortion, bias, and arbitrariness. As we’ll see later, this is precisely the kind of distinction Kierkegaard wishes to draw in order to illustrate the bright lines between the deliverances of faith and the deliverances of reason. One who would seek to ground faith in anything but experiences is not seeking God but something else.

These two specific ways of viewing the relationship between faith and reason capture in general, I believe, the distinction between the Kierkegaardian religious epistemology and the religious epistemology of contemporary believers that wish to preserve the role of reason in religious belief. The latter hold that the deliverances of faith and the deliverances of reason not only do complement each other but should complement each other. If they don’t, one or the other must be adjusted until they do (which typically entails fiddling with the rational side of the dichotomy in some fairly dramatic—sometimes amusing—ways). Many existentialists reject this move and certainly Kierkegaard would. Their position is that a belief formed existentially is epistemically isolated from beliefs formed rationally and if an argument proves an existential belief false, so much the worse for the argument. In fact, the argument is irrelevant.

I was faced with a striking example of this recently on the topic of free will. Galen Strawson has developed a powerful argument that human beings cannot be ultimately morally culpable for their actions and thus has devastating consequences for the belief that humans are agents with free will (see my summary of it here). The argument, I think, is fairly conclusive and I don’t believe a rejoinder is forthcoming. Even so, Strawson appears to have intuitions that run counter to the argument. When considering questions about the impact of the argument on our attitudes about praise and blame he writes,

“Taken as a whole, my attitudes on such questions are dramatically inconsistent. For (a) I regard any gifts that I have, and anything good that I do, as a matter of pure good fortune; so that the idea that I deserve credit for them in some strong sense seems absurd. But (b) I find I do not regard others’ achievements and good actions as pure good fortune, but feel admiration (and, where appropriate, gratitude) of a true-responsibility-presupposing kind. Furthermore, (c), I do not regard bad things that I do as mere bad luck, but have true-responsibility-presupposing attitudes to them (which may admittedly fade with time). Finally (d) I do naturally regard bad things that other people do as explicable in ways that make true-responsibility-presupposing blame inappropriate.”(Strawson, 1988)

I would go further than Strawson and admit that, even in light of the argument, it seems to me that I do engage in free acts (acts which appear to me to be entirely under my control and for which I deserve praise or blame). This intuition and “appearance” is extremely strong such that I’ve had to compartmentalize his argument in light of my experience (in other words, I don’t find myself behaving differently towards others nor has my social expectations changed all that much in spite of the argument). But there is clearly a problem here: rationally, I find the notion of free will untenable if I accept the argument but existentially, I find it irresistible. More importantly, (1) if my core intuitions and subsequent behaviors are inconsistent to what I believe to be rationally true, should I consider myself to be deluded or irrational or both? Or (2) should I reject the logic and go with my “common sense,” my intuitions, with what my experience tells me?

I believe Kirerkegaard and many existentialists would answer yes to the second question and while they would agree that such a person is irrational, they would not agree he or she is deluded. They argue that existentially grounded beliefs have no epistemic relation to a belief that a proposition that putatively is about that belief is true. This entails that any evidence or argument that provides rational support for or against the proposition provide no rational support for or against the existential belief. This is because reason itself has no relation to what is existentially known. In the context of the free will question, an existentialist might say that Strawson’s argument has nothing to do with my experience of being a free being. His argument is about something else entirely and as such should have no epistemic or behavioral implications for me as a person in the world.

The distinction between this position and one Craig or even Moser might defend is dramatic and at the core of the current debate over God. The outcome is that a belief formed existentially may strictly be irrational but this has no implications for the epistemic duties of the one holding the belief. Put another way, irrationality in no way counts against the epistemic validity of the existential belief.

In the next essay, we’ll explore why.

Copyright © 2011 Philosophy News Service


  1. Fideism is the view that certain beliefs are not justified on the basis of evidence or argument but by exercising faith that they are true. Philosophers Peterson, Hasker, Reichenbach and Basinger use the term “faithism” as an analogue for fideism (see their book Reason and Religious Belief). Fideism is similar to existentialism and some use it as a broad category under which existentialism is placed (I believe Moser does this). I do not believe this is entirely appropriate on specific formulations of fideism but this taxonomy is adequate for the purposes of this essay.

Works cited:

The Craig-Atkins Debate: Evidence For/Against the Existence of God, William Lane Craig and Peter W. Atkins April 1998, Carter Convention Center (Atlanta, Georgia).

Craig, W. L. (1994). Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics. Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway Books., pages 31ff.

Moser, P. K. (2010). The Evidence for God: Religious Knowledge Reexamined. New York: Cambridge University Press., chapter 2

Strawson, G. (1988). Consciousness, Free Will, and the Unimportance of Determinism. Inquiry, 32, 3-27.

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2011 Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Younger Scholars Competition

Dean Zimmerman announces the imminent publication of the winning essay from the 2009 Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Younger Scholars Prize: “Ontological Nihilism”, by Jason Turner (University of Leeds). It will be the lead article in Vol. 6 of OSM, due early 2011 from Oxford University Press. It is also time to remind all the younger metaphysicians out there that the due date for submission to the 2011 competition is fast approaching! It is NOT January 15 (as last OSM reported), but January 30. The winning essay will be published in OSM (often alongside runners-up) and the author receives an $8,000 prize. You still have a whole month in which to prepare your submissions. Get to it!

Full announcement

BSPR 2010 Conference - God, Mind and Knowledge

The British Society for the Philosophy of Religion

2011 Conference: God, Mind and Knowledge

Lady Margaret Hall, University of Oxford

---Call for Papers---

The next conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Religion will be at Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford from Wednesday 14th - Friday 16th September 2011. The theme for the conference will be God, Mind and Knowledge. The plenary speakers will be John Cottingham, Anthony Kenny, Robin Le Poidevin, and Charles Taliaferro.

If you would like to present a paper, please send an abstract of a maximum of 300 words to Andrew Moore by the end of March.

Papers need not be on the theme of the conference, although a preference may be displayed towards selecting those that are, other things being equal. Obviously time and space at the Conference will be limited, so we shall have to be selective, even allowing for the fact that we plan to run parallel sessions and encourage people presenting papers to keep to half-hour slots.

In order to keep to the tight timetabling required to permit participants to hear (the whole of) as many papers as possible, papers should take ideally fifteen minutes and an absolute maximum twenty minutes to deliver, leaving ten minutes or so for discussion.

Reposted from The Prosblogion

Eighth Annual Formal Epistemology Workshop

We are in the process of organizing our eighth annual formal epistemology workshop. The purpose of these workshops is to bring together faculty and graduate students with an interest in the use of formal methods in epistemology (broadly construed) in small, focused meetings. Topics of interest include (but are not limited to) the following:

• Ampliative inference (including inductive logic);
• Foundations of probability and statistics;
• Epistemic Logics and theories of belief revision;
• Game theory and decision theory (including social choice theory);
• Issues at the interface between formal and traditional epistemology.

The eighth workshop is scheduled for May 19 – 21, 2011 and will be held at the University of Southern California. The website for the workshop is (as usual):

We are now accepting submissions for FEW 2011. Please send submissions by email to Branden Fitelson . Submissions are due — in the form of full papers — by March 1, 2011; notifications of acceptance either as definite presenters or as alternates will be sent out by April 1, 2011. It is likely that some of the papers presented at FEW 2011 will appear in a special issue of the Journal of Philosophical Logic.

In addition to contributed papers, we will also have three keynote lectures. We are delighted to have the following three keynote speakers this year: Mark Colyvan, Chris Hitchcock, and Deborah Mayo.

Those interested in participating in the workshop (e.g., by commenting on a paper or helping with organization, etc.) should contact one of the organizers listed below.

We will be able to contribute $250 in travel funds for each graduate student who presents or comments on a paper. Our funding is limited this year, however, so it is unlikely that we will be able to provide funding for people who are not on the program.

Kenny Easwaran
Shieva Kleinschmidt USC
Branden Fitelson


Reposted from Certain Doubts

Religion and Psychology

The author of the site Epiphenom has compiled an interesting roll up of studies related to religion and social practice, mental health, and politics (among other things). His compilation includes the impact religious belief has on things like smoking and overeating, racism, sexual behavior, and giving blood. He links to studies that focused on religion and education particularly how religious people view science and the impact literature has on religious belief.

See his report here.

Link reposed from Common Sense Atheism

Avoiding Responsibility in Ten Easy Steps

UPDATED: 1/1/2011

I had a fruitful discussion with Jack Angstreich about Strawson’s article below. Based on that discussion and other material by Strawson that Jack pointed me to, it’s become clear to me that my analysis below is wrongheaded and that I initially badly misunderstood Strawson’s argument in the NYT piece. I read the argument in haste and wrongly made the assumption that Strawson both assumed a materialist view of the mind and also was attempting to argue that individuals are not morally responsible based on that fact. Jack pointed out that Strawson’s argument makes (or at least requires) no  metaphysical assumptions in order to work and that his argument is focused on mental states regardless of the metaphysical view one has regarding the mind. I think this is mostly correct and have come to see that Strawson’s argument is quite strong.

As I now see it, Strawson is attempting to argue that individuals cannot be morally responsible because one’s moral decisions are an outcome of the way one is at the time the decision is made. I originally took this to mean that the state of one’s brain and body prior to a moral act (antecedent conditions) determines one moral actions. But I now see that Strawson is only concerned with the state of one’s mental life at the moment of a moral decision—it doesn’t matter whether determinism is true or indeterminism is true, whether one is a dualist or a materialist. The reason it doesn’t matter is because the argument claims that a moral decision is the outcome of the mental state of the person (the development of much of that mental state being out of the persons direct or indirect control) and this is true regardless of one’s metaphysics.

Suppose you face the decision to put money in the Oxfam tin. The following may be true:

~ You want to help the poor person
~ You believe you can afford it
~ You want to feel better about yourself

But suppose the follow also are true

~ You want cake really badly
~ You're tired of people begging for money and don't want to support it
~ You promised your spouse you'd bring home the cake

Let’s suppose you choose not to put money in the tin. One could argue that the above six antecedent beliefs and desires are in moral parity for you: they neither determine that you’ll act (put money in the tin) or refrain from acting (withhold money from the tin). Now let’s also suppose the following: dualism is true (you have a non-material soul) that possesses an active power over which you have control and that you’re rational (generally considered three necessary conditions for a free act on Libertarianism). Let’s also assume that it makes sense to say you can choose to act or refrain from acting in this case. This means that your action is strictly uncaused but choose to act or refrain from acting in order to meet some yet not-realized goal. Since the antecedent conditions do not determine your actions, why did you make the choice you did?

If we ask why you refrained, there either is an answer to that question or there isn’t (this isn’t merely an epistemological claim—I’m saying there is or is not a metaphysical antecedent that explains the decision). If there isn’t, then the choice appears to be random and violates the third of the three necessary conditions for a free act. If there is a reason (let’s say you acted because you put more value in the second set of beliefs and desires more than the first), then that value judgment would be included in the first of Strawson’s premises in the Basic Argument: You do what you do — in the circumstances in which you find yourself—because of the way you then are. In this situation, we could capture this by asking, “why did you value the second set over the first such that it influence your decision?” If your decision was truly yours, it came out of the state you were in at the time of the decision the development of which may be partly or entirely out of your control. How, then, could you be responsible for the choice to value the second rather than the first set and thus for the choice to refrain from putting money in the tin?

Of course Libertarians would not say that one’s character (I think we could substitute “the state of one’s mental life”) at the point of any moral decision is not important in decision making. However Libertarians would argue, I think, that it’s possible to act in a way other than what your character might dictate (without this power, one might run into problems similar to the one presented in the Reformer’s Dilemma). Instead of the second set of reasons functioning as efficient causes (“that by means of which”), they function as final causes (“that for the sake of which”). The problem for this response is in how one ought to understand how the notion of final causality works here. If a person chooses to refrain from putting money in the tin for the sake of meeting the goal of valuing the second set of beliefs and desires, isn’t it true that the person is in a state where she values the second set of beliefs and desires or at least in a state where she wants to be in a state where she values them? If the answer is yes, then we’re back to Strawson’s first premise; if no then we’re on the road to an infinite regress.

There is much more to explore here but I acknowledge that Strawson’s argument is powerful and strikes at the heart of the free will debate. Thanks to Jack for setting me straight and for some thought-provoking discussion.

Original post of July 23, 2010.

Philosopher Galen Strawson for The New York Times philosophy column“The Stone” presents an argument (well, one argument in three different forms)--the logic of which he believes is irresistible--for why persons cannot be “ultimately” responsible. He argues that for any given choice we make, we do what we do based on the way we are at the moment. But the way we are is not under our control but is a product of our genes and previous experiences. If we did not choose and cannot change the way we are, and our choice is based on the way we are, then we are not ultimately responsible (I wonder if we’re proximately responsible—Strawson does not say) for the choice. Ian McEwan calls the argument watertight.

The argument ends up being a reductivist argument popularly written. But reductionism is very much like behaviorism in that it fails to account for first person experience. If an argument proves I don’t see the color red when I’m looking at a red object, then so much the worse for the argument. (As Professor Daniel Robinson has said, “If your doctor tells you you’re not in pain when you are in pain, it’s time to find another doctor.”) Strawson’s argument also seems to be question begging. If he is attempting to ask whether our perception of freedom really is actual freedom, then his first premise (in the first version of the argument) seems to sneak in the conclusion: “You do what you do — in the circumstances in which you find yourself—because of the way you then are". But isn’t that what we want to know? Is it the case that we do what we do because of the way we then are or is it that we can act in ways other than the way we are? Perhaps we do what we do because of the way we want to be. Perhaps our perception that we are goal directed beings is an indication that we are goal directed beings and that the background belief that selves are completely governed by natural law is incomplete (or just plain false).

Why does Strawson seem to think his argument is so strong? And I’m confident he would reject the claim that it’s question begging. Why does he deny that our experience of free acts are “feelings” only and do not represent any actual choice we’re making? Jaegwon Kim’s exclusion argument provides an answer. The argument goes like this. Physicallists (Kim would put himself in this camp) believe in the causal closure of the physical domain which he takes to involve the following conditional: if a physical event has a cause (occurring) at time t, it has a sufficient physical cause at t. But, says Kim, this principle causes problems when it comes to mental events. More...

The Reports of Philosophy’s Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated

John Haldane for First Things says no. In fact, says Haldane, their arguments for M-theory are philosophical in nature and thus demonstrate the continued relevance of philosophy particularly in theoretical phyisics. Even if one disagrees with his analysis of Hawking and Mlodinow’s arguments, I think he’s correct that their pronouncement that philosophy is dead is somewhat undermined by their reliance on it.

Thanks to Greg Taft for the link.

Call for abstracts: Experimental Philosophy

Mark Phelan is organizing the second annual Experimental Philosophy Workshop in New York City, and the Call for Abstracts has just been posted.

Abstracts are only 1,000 words and can present either experimental results or more theoretical work. The deadline is February 10th.

The conference itself will take place on March 26th. Invited speakers include Alvin Goldman, Kurt Gray, Edouard Machery, Shaun Nichols, David Rosenthal, and Susanna Siegel. Although submitted abstracts can be on any aspect of experimental philosophy, the invited speakers will be focusing on folk attributions of consciousness.

Consciousness Online Final CFP

The deadline for contributed submissions to the 3rd Online Consciousness Conference at Consciousness Online is this Wednesday January 5th 2011. Submit papers to

This year the conference has as its theme Neurophilosophy and the Philosophy of Neuroscience with invited talks by Paul Churchland, Kathleen Akins with commentary by Pete Mandik, Stevan Harnad, and Jesse Prinz. I am also pleased to announce a special session organized by Jacob Berger featuring a paper by Benj Heille on Direct Realism and Perceptual Justification and respondents tba. Papers need not be related to the theme to be considered for inclusion in the conference but papers that are related to the theme will, pending additional external review, be published in the special issue of Synthese "Neuroscience and its Philosophy".

For more information see the conference website;

Kierkegaard and the Modern Religious Mind

I met my wife-to-be when I was 17 and she 14. She was from Oregon, I was from New York. She grew up in a middle-class town consisting mainly of residents of Irish, Scottish, and German descent. I was raised lower-middle class in a homogenous population of second and third generation Italian-Americans. She loved sushi, salsa, smoked salmon, and lima beans. I subsisted mainly on pasta with red sauce and Iceberg lettuce salads. Distance, age, family background, economics, and a long list of other circumstances should have kept us apart. Yet we found ourselves spending a summer together and connected on wholly irrelevant grounds: we both are identical twins. Our relationship made little sense and most everyone we knew let us know it. My mother regularly reminded me of my full-blooded Italian heritage and the implications of “breaking the chain.” Her father, with a knowing grin on his face, thought that “dating” a scrawny boy of 17  who lived 3000 miles away wouldn’t last more than 3 months. Our twin siblings, amused by the quaint letter writing and phone calls, didn’t get it. Our worlds couldn’t have been more distant. Our families couldn’t have been more different. Yet we were in love. Damn the critics and naysayers and all the reasons why it wouldn’t work. We didn’t care what was reasonable. We cared about each other and we wanted nothing more than to be together and spend each waking minute with each other.

For Søren Kierkegaard, being a Christian is like falling in love. Most passionate, erotic relationships are not rational nor should they be. They are not strictly irrational though Cruise-Oprah-Crazy-in-lovereason doesn’t seem to apply to them. When two people fall in love, they may know very little about one another but this is not relevant; in fact its part of its virtue. Common sense becomes a ballast and the lovers discard it, intentionally or not, for the possibility that all the promises they hope are true will be realized. To those on the outside, their relationship may seem silly at best and dangerous or harmful at worst. Yet they jump in with both feet, critics and naysayers be damned. Theirs is a voyage christened by passion and driven by the excitement of a lifetime of discovery and private, personal moments that only the two will share. Their relationship is lived each moment, and only analyzed or talked about or reasoned with when disaster strikes. They have nothing to prove to outsiders and seek to be true only to themselves and what they’ve committed to each other.

If one is to be a true Christian, says Kierkegaard, one must take a similar leap of faith.

This idea is so important and so central to my thesis in this series that I will now say plainly what I have only hinted at thus far: if one wishes to understand the contemporary religious worldview, he or she must first understand Kierkegaard’s religious epistemology. I think it could be convincingly argued that Kierkegaard has had and currently does have very little direct, global influence on the contemporary religious mind and religious belief and even exerts little explicit influence in the West. But this is to view Kierkegaard only as an ideologue—something he would have passionately rejected. I find him relevant mainly (ironically) in his role as an analyst and polemicist. Kierkegaard understood perhaps better than anyone before or since the essence of the religious frame of mind--what it is or what people hope it to be. In this role, Kierkegaard spans Western religious thought and could be seen to provide us with a searing analysis of religion per se. It is in this role that I will examine his ideas and I will do so through examining various stages or movements in his thought.


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