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Cognitivism and Moral / Philosophical Peer Intransigence

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Richard Rowlands' forthcoming Analysis paper on 'The Intelligibility of Moral Intransigence' presents a curious argument against moral cognitivism.  It goes roughly as follows:P1. Beliefs track perceived evidence.P2. Perceived peer disagreement is perceived evidence.Hence C1. Peer intransigent judgments are not beliefs.P3. Moral peer intransigence is intelligible: moral judgments can be peer intransigent.Hence C2: Moral judgments are not beliefs.The argument seems to prove too much, insofar as one could just as well replace 'moral' with 'philosophical' in P3, but non-cognitivism about all philosophy seems pretty absurd.So, where does it go wrong?  I suggest P2.  As per my previous post, peer disagreement is not necessarily epistemically relevant.  A peer's disagreement is only evidence against your current view if it is evidence that you've made a mistake by your own lights.  But in many (philosophical, but especially moral) cases it is instead. . .

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