Iterating Badness in the Paradox of Deontology

In 'Must Consequentialists Kill?' (forthcoming in J Phil), Setiya convincingly argues against the "orthodox" view that commonsense verdicts about the ethics of killing entail agent-relativity. 
Philosophy News image
In 'Must Consequentialists Kill?' (forthcoming in J Phil), Setiya convincingly argues against the "orthodox" view that commonsense verdicts about the ethics of killing entail agent-relativity.  Instead, he observes: "In general, when you should not cause harm to one in a way that will benefit others, you should not want others to do so either." (p.8 on pre-print version)  For example, it's not just the agent that should prefer to avoid themselves killing one to prevent five killings, but we should generally prefer that others likewise avoid killing one to prevent five other killings.  The preference here mandated by commonsense morality is thus agent-neutral in nature: it makes no essential reference to your role in the situation.This seems right (I mean, correct as a claim about "commonsense morality", not actually right...), and it avoids one horn of the paradox of deontology, namely worries about how the reasons to act morally, if merely. . .

Continue reading . . .

News source: Philosophy, et cetera

blog comments powered by Disqus