Constructivism in Metaethics

[Revised entry by Carla Bagnoli on June 23, 2017. Changes to: Main text, Bibliography] Metaethical constructivism is the view that insofar as there are normative truths, they are not fixed by
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[Revised entry by Carla Bagnoli on June 23, 2017. Changes to: Main text, Bibliography] Metaethical constructivism is the view that insofar as there are normative truths, they are not fixed by normative facts that are independent of what rational agents would agree to under some specified conditions of choice. The appeal of this view lies in the promise to explain how normative truths are objective and independent of our actual judgments, while also binding and authoritative for us....

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News source: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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