Where your mind goes, you go? (Part 2)

Is there some other way to resolve the duplication problem that acknowledges this insight? Remember that according to Parfit, we all agree that if my brain is transplanted into someone else’s
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If your brain, along with your memories and personality, is transplanted into another human body, would you now inhabit that new body? If someone was in a car accident and suffered amnesia, can we still consider that to be the same person? On 23 February, Michelle Maiese shared her ideas about the connection between the psychological and biological self. Below, Michelle continues a deeper exploration into human existence and questions which factors make up our personal identities. The dominant approach to personal identity says that a person persists over time by virtue of facts about psychological continuity. However, this approach faces a so-called duplication problem: a single person can be psychologically continuous with two or more persons. Derek Parfit’s solution is to suppose that what we care about in survival is psychological continuity and connectedness, which is a form of continued existence that does not imply identity through time. Even when psychological continuity is. . .

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News source: OUPblog » Philosophy

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