Self-Deception

[Revised entry by Ian Deweese-Boyd on November 7, 2016. Changes to: Main text, Bibliography] Virtually every aspect of self-deception, including its definition and paradigmatic cases, is a matter
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[Revised entry by Ian Deweese-Boyd on November 7, 2016. Changes to: Main text, Bibliography] Virtually every aspect of self-deception, including its definition and paradigmatic cases, is a matter of controversy among philosophers. Minimally, self-deception involves a person who seems to acquire and maintain some false belief in the teeth of evidence to the contrary as a consequence of some motivation, and who may display behavior suggesting some awareness of the truth. Beyond this, philosophers divide over whether self-deception is intentional, involves belief or some other sub-or-non-doxastic attitude, whether self-deceivers are...

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News source: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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