Moral responsibilities when waging war

In his long-awaited report on the circumstances surrounding the United Kingdom’s decision to join forces with the United States and invade Iraq in 2003, Sir John Chilcot lists a number of failings
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In his long-awaited report on the circumstances surrounding the United Kingdom’s decision to join forces with the United States and invade Iraq in 2003, Sir John Chilcot lists a number of failings on the part of the then-British leadership. In particular, he pays close attention to the aftermath of the war and, more specifically, to the absence of proper post-invasion planning. With devastatingly forensic precision, he notes that Prime Minister Tony Blair, the relevant Cabinet Ministers and senior officials (a) were fully aware of the likelihood of post-invasion internecine violence, of the need to reconstruct the country, and of the importance of a properly constituted interim civil administration; (b) were aware of the deficiencies in the USA’s post invasion plans; (c) did not undertake proper risk assessments or consider various post-invasion options. The claim that the Coalition failed to prepare for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, and that its failure is a moral failure as much as a. . .

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News source: OUPblog » Philosophy

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