Intuitive Expertise and Irrelevant Options

Some time ago we asked you for participation in a study (http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2016/03/experiment-on-moral-decisions.html OR
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Some time ago we asked you for participation in a study (http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2016/03/experiment-on-moral-decisions.html   OR   http://philosophycommons.typepad.com/xphi/2016/03/call-for-participants-experiment-on-moral-decisions.html) that presented professional philosophers and lay people with two moral scenarios. One of them included two options, the other included these two options and four additional options, i.e., six options. Our aim was to investigate whether the additional options would affect people’s choices concerning the two options that were available in both scenarios – despite the fact that the additional options are irrelevant for that choice. In particular, we wanted to test whether the intuitive responses of professional philosophers were less susceptible to the influence of irrelevant options than those of lay people. However, we found that professional philosophers’ intuitions were even more susceptible to the presence of irrelevant options than lay. . .

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News source: Experimental Philosophy

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