Epistemic Intuitions are Shockingly Robust Across Cultural Differences

Around a year ago, I wrote about a really beautiful study by Machery and colleagues on cross-cultural similarities in epistemic intuitions. The study looked at intuitions about Gettier cases in four
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Around a year ago, I wrote about a really beautiful study by Machery and colleagues on cross-cultural similarities in epistemic intuitions. The study looked at intuitions about Gettier cases in four different cultures and found that the Gettier intuition was remarkably robust across demographic differences.  But of course, I could imagine some readers seeing this as relatively poor evidence of cross-cultural robustness. "After all," they might say, "the Gettier intuition is one of the most fundamental aspects of our practice of knowledge attribution. Even if this one intuition turns out to be widely shared, the more subtle and complex aspects of our epistemic intuitions might easily turn out to vary across cultures."  Now, a year later, we have more information about this question. The unstoppable team of Minsun Kim and Yuan Yuan has just completed a new paper on the topic, and they provide evidence for a very surprising degree of cross-cultural robustness.  Kim and Yuan look at three. . .

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News source: Experimental Philosophy

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