Experimental Philosophy and the Law

Some of you may be interested in "Belief States in Criminal Law," a forthcoming article I recently posted on SSRN. It's an updated version of the paper I presented at last year's X-Phi conference at
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Some of you may be interested in "Belief States in Criminal Law," a forthcoming article I recently posted on SSRN.  It's an updated version of the paper I presented at last year's X-Phi conference at University of Buffalo.  Many thanks to those I met there and elsewhere for your insightful comments on this paper and related projects.  More comments are always welcome!  Here is the abstract:Belief-state ascription—determining what someone “knew,” “believed,” was “aware of,” etc.—is central to many areas of law. In criminal law, the distinction between knowledge and recklessness, and the use of broad jury instructions concerning other belief states, presupposes a common and stable understanding of what those belief-state terms mean. But a wealth of empirical work at the intersection of philosophy and psychology—falling under the banner of “Experimental Epistemology”—reveals how laypeople’s understandings of mens rea concepts differ systematically from what scholars, courts, and perhaps. . .

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News source: Experimental Philosophy

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