Imagining zombies

Understanding the relationship between the mind and the body remains one of the most vexed problems in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience. Physicalism has not reigned unchallenged,
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Understanding the relationship between the mind and the body remains one of the most vexed problems in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience. Throughout much of the last hundred years, physicalism has been the orthodox position in the philosophy of mind. Physicalist views share the characteristic attitude that mental phenomena — such as beliefs, desires, experiences and emotions — are either nothing but physical phenomena — brain states, say — or are in some important sense accounted for or made real by physical phenomena. Physicalism has not reigned unchallenged, however. A number of arguments have been raised which promote dualism in its place — the view that fundamentally, the mind and body are separate, and mental phenomena can never be adequately characterised in terms of physical goings-on. Perhaps the most prominent and widely discussed of these is the ‘Zombie Argument’, developed and defended by David Chalmers over the past twenty-five. . .

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News source: OUPblog » Philosophy

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