Ideas, Evidence, and Method: Hume's Skepticism and Naturalism concerning Knowledge and Causation

2016.02.38 : View this Review Online | View Recent NDPR Reviews Graciela De Pierris, Ideas, Evidence, and Method: Hume's Skepticism and Naturalism concerning Knowledge and Causation, Oxford
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2016.02.38 : View this Review Online | View Recent NDPR Reviews Graciela De Pierris, Ideas, Evidence, and Method: Hume's Skepticism and Naturalism concerning Knowledge and Causation, Oxford University Press, 2015, 318pp., $74.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780198716785. Reviewed by Kevin Meeker and T. Allan Hillman, University of South Alabama As the subtitle suggests, in this book Graciela De Pierris offers an interpretation of Hume that takes seriously both his alleged (radical) skepticism on the one hand, and his (apparent) commitment to a naturalistic methodology on the other. More specifically, she tries to show that Hume's apparent commitments to both "skepticism and naturalism -- despite the fact that they represent two conflicting viewpoints -- turn out to be two equally important and mutually complementary aspects of Hume's philosophical position" (1). The book is divided into an Introduction (largely a detailed overview of the central claims of the work) and five distinct. . .

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