An empirical refutation of "ought" implies "can"

In a beautiful series of studies, a research team from Duke empirically refutes strong versions of the "ought" implies "can"
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In a beautifully written and insightful paper just published in Cognition, a team of researchers from Duke reports a series of studies on the “ought” implies “can” principle in ordinary moral cognition.* The main question was whether there is a conceptual entailment from what someone “ought” to do to what they “can” do, as those concepts are ordinarily understood.In one experiment, the team tested people’s judgments about two versions of a case (within-subjects). Both versions of the case started the same way:Adams promises to meet his friend Brown for lunch at noon today. It takes Adams thirty minutes to drive from his house to the place where they plan to eat lunch together.The “low blame” version of the case ended like this:Adams leaves his house at eleven thirty. However, fifteen minutes after leaving, Adams car breaks down unexpectedly. Because his car is not working at that time, Adams cannot meet his friend Brown at noon, as he promised.The “high blame” version of the case. . .

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News source: Experimental Philosophy

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