Proto-reliabilism followup

Following up on some thoughtful suggestions in the comments to my previous post, I ran a couple follow-up studies with modified stimuli. One main question was whether people understood an
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Following up on some thoughtful suggestions in the comments to my previous post, I ran a couple follow-up studies with modified stimuli. One main question was whether people understood an “unreliable memory” to mean (1) most of the agent’s apparent memories contain false information, as opposed to (2) most of the agent apparent memories contain true information, even though the agent fails to retain information most of the time. If people understand “unreliable memory” in sense 2, then it could complicate the interpretation of one of the findings that undermine the proto-reliabilist hypothesis. Will we observe similar results if it’s made clearer that sense 1 is at issue? To emphasize sense 1, I tested the following pair of cases (the reliability manipulation is bracketed): Alvin is [unreliable/reliable] at remembering driving directions. Usually when it seems to him that he should make a particular turn, he’s [incorrect/correct]. Today Alvin is. . .

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