Knowledge of being manipulated does not affect moral responsibility. What?!

This past semester I was working with Fiery Cushman and an RA on some studies on manipulation and moral responsibility and we ended up with some findings that I'm completely puzzled by, so I thought
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This past semester I was working with Fiery Cushman and an RA on some studies on manipulation and moral responsibility and we ended up with some findings that I'm completely puzzled by, so I thought I'd see if you all have any ideas about them. (In case you want to read more on the background x-phi work on manipulation, you can find some of that: here, here, here, and here). One of the things I wanted to test was the intuitive idea that a critical aspect of being manipulated was not knowing that you were being manipulated. Intuitively, it seems like one is more responsible for doing an immoral action when you are aware that the environment has been set up so that you'll do that action. To test this basic idea, we designed a relatively simple study.In one condition, the manipulated agent didn't know they were being manipulated:In the 1950s, the government of a small Eastern European country plotted to secretly start a war, using industrial workers, and get revenge on a neighboring. . .

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News source: Experimental Philosophy

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