Epistemic Utility Arguments for Probabilism

[Revised entry by Richard Pettigrew on December 17, 2015. Changes to: Main text] Our beliefs come in degrees; we believe some more strongly than others. For instance, I believe that the sun will
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[Revised entry by Richard Pettigrew on December 17, 2015. Changes to: Main text] Our beliefs come in degrees; we believe some more strongly than others. For instance, I believe that the sun will rise tomorrow more strongly than I believe that it will rise every morning for the coming week; and I believe both of these propositions much more strongly than I believe that there will be an earthquake tomorrow in Bristol. We call the strength or the degree of our belief in a proposition our credence in that proposition. Suppose I know that a die is to be rolled, and I believe that it will land on six more strongly than I believe that it will land on an even number. In this case, we...

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News source: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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