The Subject of Freedom: Kant, Levinas

2015.12.06 : View this Review Online | View Recent NDPR Reviews Gabriela Basterra, The Subject of Freedom: Kant, Levinas, Fordham University Press, 2015, 197pp., $29.00 (pbk), ISBN
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2015.12.06 : View this Review Online | View Recent NDPR Reviews Gabriela Basterra, The Subject of Freedom: Kant, Levinas, Fordham University Press, 2015, 197pp., $29.00 (pbk), ISBN 9780823265152. Reviewed by Kevin Houser, Case Western Reserve University "What is a subject?" "In what sense is it free?" If we ask Kant and Levinas these questions we expect incompatible answers -- an expectation encouraged by Levinas, who often deploys Kant as a foil for his own views about reason, morality, and freedom. The flash points are by now familiar. Kant supposes morality arises from practical reason's structure. Levinas, by contrast, insists it is the face of the other that structures rationality and "opens the will to reason." Kant thinks the moral relationship arises from being subject to a common law. Levinas holds that the law is an artifact of a normatively prior ethical relation based on alterity -- precisely what we can never have in common. Kant supposes the morally. . .

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News source: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // News

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