The Poverty of Conceptual Truth: Kant's Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and the Limits of Metaphysics

2015.10.22 : View this Review Online | View Recent NDPR Reviews R. Lanier Anderson, The Poverty of Conceptual Truth: Kant's Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and the Limits of Metaphysics, Oxford
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2015.10.22 : View this Review Online | View Recent NDPR Reviews R. Lanier Anderson, The Poverty of Conceptual Truth: Kant's Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and the Limits of Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, 2015, 408pp., $82.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780198724575. Reviewed by Colin McLear, University of Nebraska--Lincoln One of the central, and perhaps most (in)famous, contributions of Kant's critical philosophy is his distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments (or propositions). This distinction has been the subject of numerous debates, including but not limited to two central issues: the cogency of the distinction and its novelty in Kant's work. R. Lanier Anderson's excellent new book aims to show that we can achieve new insight into Kant's distinction via sustained attention to his historical context. In particular, he argues that full appreciation of Kant's argument for the existence of synthetic judgment requires proper attention to the details of Kant's. . .

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