Deliberative Openness and the Actualism-Possibilism Dispute

There's been some interesting discussion at PEA Soup recently about the Actualism-Possibilism dispute. A key issue here concerns when agents are allowed to treat their own dispositions as
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There's been some interesting discussion at PEA Soup recently about the Actualism-Possibilism dispute. A key issue here concerns when agents are allowed to treat their own dispositions as "fixed" for the purposes of deliberation.  As Sergio Tenenbaum puts it, after noting that he would want and advise the deliberating agent to do other than what possibilism obliges him to do, "I can take the facts about what he’ll do as settled while giving advice, in a way that he can’t while deliberating."While there is a truth in this vicinity -- we certainly can't take as settled the outcome of our present deliberation -- I think Tenenbaum's extension of this principle to future behaviour is importantly mistaken.  What we should hold fixed during deliberation depends not on the identities of anyone involved (e.g. treating my own behaviour as open but others as fixed), but just on what results are actually "open" possibilities depending on the outcome of my present deliberation.. . .

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News source: Philosophy, et cetera

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