Unifying morality's effect on non-moral cognition

At this point, it is pretty clear is that people’s moral judgments affect a surprisingly large number of their judgments that do not seem to be straightforwardly moral (e.g., belief, causation,
Philosophy News image
At this point, it is pretty clear is that people’s moral judgments affect a surprisingly large number of their judgments that do not seem to be straightforwardly moral (e.g., belief, causation, doing vs. allowing, freedom, happiness, innateness, intentional action, knowledge, love, and so on) The sheer number of different judgments affected by morality provides some reason against continuing to search for separate explanations for each effect. Rather, it looks as though we should be searching for ways in which the various effects of morality may be unified. Of course, the sort of explanation that could unify these various effects would have to be so abstract that it could be playing a role in each of these diverse kinds of judgments.In a new paper, we propose that the key to understanding how these effects can be unified is to begin thinking about the role of alternative possibilities. The basic idea is that our way of understanding many aspects of the world involves not only thinking. . .

Continue reading . . .

News source: Experimental Philosophy

blog comments powered by Disqus