A Distant Realm: Rethinking the Procreative Asymmetry

Surprisingly many philosophers seem inclined to accept(Procreative Reasons Asymmetry): While we have strong reasons against bringing miserable lives into existence, we have no reasons (all else
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Surprisingly many philosophers seem inclined to accept(Procreative Reasons Asymmetry): While we have strong reasons against bringing miserable lives into existence, we have no reasons (all else being equal) to bring awesome lives into existence.I've previously argued that considerations of demandingness suffice to explain why people are not generally obliged to procreate, in a way that leaves untouched the commonsense idea that awesome lives are amongst the best things the universe can contain, and so (all else equal) it's generally a good thing to bring about more such awesome lives.We may now add: Since we have (some) reason to bring about good outcomes, we thus have (some) reason to bring awesome lives into existence.  So PRA is false.To illustrate with a simple case:(Distant Realm): Suppose you learn that a new colony of awesome, happy, flourishing people will pop into existence in some distant, causally-isolated realm, unless you pluck and eat a. . .

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