Judgmentalism vs Non-commitalism

Call Non-commitalism the view that we sometimes ought to suspend belief, assign imprecise credences spanning the entire interval [0,1], or otherwise refrain from doxastic commitment.Opposing this,
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Call Non-commitalism the view that we sometimes ought to suspend belief, assign imprecise credences spanning the entire interval [0,1], or otherwise refrain from doxastic commitment.Opposing this, we have Judgmentalism, the view that we're never required to suspend judgment: there's always some doxastic commitment or other that we could at least as reasonably hold.We might go further and consider Strong Judgmentalism, the view that there is always some doxastic commitment (e.g. some level of credence) that's rationally superior to suspending judgment entirely.Which of these views is most plausible?  And (for any epistemologists in the audience) is there any existing literature on the topic?  (I just made up these names, so they might go by different labels if so...)I find myself drawn to Strong Judgmentalism, but would settle for defending Judgmentalism against Non-commitalism.  I see three main routes to doing so:(1) Co-opt existing arguments. . .

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