Demandingness and Opt-in vs Opt-out sacrifices

I've long thought that we should understand moral demandingness in terms of mental rather than material burdens.  My willpower satisficing paper (soon to be updated!) previously tried
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I've long thought that we should understand moral demandingness in terms of mental rather than material burdens.  My willpower satisficing paper (soon to be updated!) previously tried motivating this by comparing a "doing demand" vs. an "allowing demand", where the former asked the agent to positively give up half their savings to effective charities, and the second merely asked the agent not to dodge a "Robin Hood" tax that would have the same effect.  The intended verdict is an intuition to the effect that the former request is "more demanding", because more psychologically difficult to comply with, despite being equally costly. But it was a messy case, with all sorts of potential confounders.  So I now think a better example for my purposes is to contrast similar "opt in" and "opt out" scenarios.  Consider:Opt in: Your local credit union (following the results of a member referendum that you voted against) send all investors with savings accounts,. . .

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