The Best Case for Voting

To follow up on my last post, let's consider a Regan-esque case for voting.The set-up: Suppose there are two candidates, Good and Bad, and a large population (e.g. several million voters).
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To follow up on my last post, let's consider a Regan-esque case for voting.The set-up: Suppose there are two candidates, Good and Bad, and a large population (e.g. several million voters).  90% of the population are unreasoning voters, and suppose that each such voter is (independently) 0.55 likely to vote for Bad, and 0.45 likely to vote for Good.  Suppose that the remaining 10% of the population consists of utilitarians, who are initially disposed not to vote (unless their voting will be instrumental to changing the result from Bad to Good).  I am one such, and I wonder whether I should bother voting.The verdict: Any one such utilitarian, reasoning in isolation, can be extremely confident that their individual vote will make no difference, to the point that the expected value of voting is effectively zero (cf. J. Brennan, The Ethics of Voting, pp.19-20).  That slight bias in favour of Bad, played out over millions of independent chance events. . .

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