Valuing Unnecessary Causal Contributions

In 'Why Citizens Should Vote: A Causal Responsibility Approach', Alvin Goldman argues that (i) there's a sense in which each vote for the winning party causally contributes to their victory, even if
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In 'Why Citizens Should Vote: A Causal Responsibility Approach', Alvin Goldman argues that (i) there's a sense in which each vote for the winning party causally contributes to their victory, even if they receive many more votes than are necessary for victory (and similarly each vote against the winning party serves to causally "counteract" them), and (ii) you are morally responsible for outcomes that you are, in this way, causally responsible for.  So you get moral credit for voting for good parties, and against bad ones, and on this basis have (non-trivial) reasons to act accordingly.I'm happy to grant this talk of "causal contribution", but I wonder about its normative significance. I'm more inclined towards Donald Regan's account of the ethics of cooperation and coordination. Roughly: we should be disposed to coordinate with like-minded others to bring about the best collectively possible results. But if others are not disposed to coordinate with you, then there's no. . .

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