Are "Internal Reasons" Normative?

Bernard Williams, in his 'Internal and External Reasons', introduces the internal interpretation of 'A has a reason to ϕ' as "impl[ying], very roughly, that A has some motive which will be
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Bernard Williams, in his 'Internal and External Reasons', introduces the internal interpretation of 'A has a reason to ϕ' as "impl[ying], very roughly, that A has some motive which will be served or furthered by his ϕ-ing, and if this turns out not to be so then sentence is false: there is a condition relating to the agent's aims, and if this is not satisfied it is not true to say, on this interpretation, that he has a reason to ϕ."  On the external interpretation of the reasons-claim, by contrast, "there is no such condition."This makes it sound like internal reason is a complex concept.  We start with the basic (external) concept of a normative reason -- a fact that counts in favour, has normative force, or whatnot -- and then add a quirky motivational constraint.But of course that can't really be what Williams has in mind, because he wants to cast doubt on the very coherence of the idea of external reasons. ("What is it that one comes to. . .

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News source: Philosophy, et cetera

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