Question about Language - Marc Lange responds

The standard way of thinking about 'mental disorders' goes like this: Take some phenomena and think of a name that stands for all phenomena together. So far nothing wrong. But then it happens,
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The standard way of thinking about 'mental disorders' goes like this: Take some phenomena and think of a name that stands for all phenomena together. So far nothing wrong. But then it happens, the given name is being crowned as cause of the phenomena... as in the expression; "depression causes low self esteem, a sense of emptiness,..." while depression is just a given name for all those phenomena. To me that seems as an insult to the laws of logic. Can someone state a logical proof that this way of thinking is against logical laws? Response from: Marc Lange If a mental disorder referred simply to a collection of symptoms, then it could not be a cause of those symptoms. You are exactly right about this. A cause must be distinct from its effect. That is why we cannot say that my slamming the door was a cause of my shutting the door (where "slamming the door" is nothing more than shutting the door with some force). However, it is not at all obvious that the name of a mental. . .

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