Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness

[Revised entry by Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi on December 24, 2014. Changes to: Main text, Bibliography, notes.html] On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a
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[Revised entry by Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi on December 24, 2014. Changes to: Main text, Bibliography, notes.html] On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as my experience. For phenomenologists, this immediate and first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena is accounted for in terms of a pre-reflective self-consciousness. In the most basic...

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News source: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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