Good Lives and Procreative Duties

Many philosophers seem inclined to accept(Procreative Axiological Asymmetry): While it would be bad, or undesirable, to bring a miserable life into existence, it isn't good, or desirable, to bring
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Many philosophers seem inclined to accept(Procreative Axiological Asymmetry): While it would be bad, or undesirable, to bring a miserable life into existence, it isn't good, or desirable, to bring an awesome life into existence.in order to secure(Procreative Deontic Asymmetry): While we are obliged to not bring miserable lives into existence, we are not obliged to bring awesome lives into existence.PDA is certainly very intuitive.  There seem several routes by which it could be defended.  Adopting PAA to this end strikes me as a particularly odd route for defending PDA.  In general, the inference(No Duty → No Good) We shouldn't be required to do X, therefore there is nothing good about Xdoes not seem a particularly appealing one.  It would be more than passing strange for a convinced opponent of Singer-style duties of beneficence (for example) to try to ground their view by claiming that the welfare of people in developing countries just doesn't matter.. . .

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