Where QALYs Go Wrong

My paper 'Against "Saving Lives": Equal Concern and Differential Impact' defends the use of QALYs (Quality-Adjusted Life Years) in medical resource allocation against several traditional objections.
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My paper 'Against "Saving Lives": Equal Concern and Differential Impact' defends the use of QALYs (Quality-Adjusted Life Years) in medical resource allocation against several traditional objections. But along the way, I note several respects in which (it seems to me) not all life years -- even in perfect health -- are equal, and hence a straightforward QALY-maximization approach falls short.  I'll briefly outline them below, and invite readers to suggest any further examples I may have missed...(1) Non-persons and new persons.Suppose you could either (i) save the life of a ten year old child, (ii) save the life of a ten week old infant, or (iii) conceive and bring into existence an entirely new child. Supposing that the individuals in question will face no future health risks until they die of old age, it appears that the options are listed in increasing order of QALYs thereby "gained". But it seems entirely backward to think that this corresponds to the moral desirability of. . .

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News source: Philosophy, et cetera

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