From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays

2014.08.39 : View this Review Online | View Recent NDPR Reviews Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks, and Gerhard Preyer (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays, Oxford
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2014.08.39 : View this Review Online | View Recent NDPR Reviews Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks, and Gerhard Preyer (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays, Oxford University Press, 2014, 225pp., $74.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780199936502. Reviewed by Jennifer Lackey, Northwestern University We attribute intentions to both individuals and to collective entities. Just as individuals do, groups might intend to break their promises or to honor their agreements or to draft a proposal. Moreover, our holding groups responsible for their actions often turns on our ability to properly attribute intentions to them, so there is a great deal at stake here. But how we understand these phenomena, and their relationship to one another, is far from straightforward. Can groups, for instance, have intentions that no individual member has? Is the rationality of groups wholly determined by the rationality of their members? How can collective entities perform actions when. . .

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News source: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // News

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