In defence of adherence

What more is required of a belief, besides being justified and true (JTB), if the belief is to count as knowledge? In my view, at least two further conditions are required: the belief must meet the
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What more is required of a belief, besides being justified and true (JTB), if the belief is to count as knowledge? In my view, at least two further conditions are required: the belief must meet the conditions of safety and adherence. Safety is popular these days: it has been defended by many distinguished epistemologists, such as Duncan Pritchard and Timothy Williamson, among others. But adherence – the fourth condition that Robert Nozick imposed on knowledge – has few defenders. Most of the philosophers who have discussed adherence have rejected it. In this post, I defend adherence against its detractors. First, let me explain how I understand adherence. Let us focus on a case C1 in which a believer believes a true proposition p1 in a doxastically justified or rational manner. Then this belief “adheres to the truth” if and only if, in every normal case C2 that is sufficiently similar to C1 with respect to what makes the belief rationally held in C1, and with respect to the case’s. . .

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News source: Certain Doubts

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