Non-Normative Epistemology?

I've previously cited epistemic nihilism as an example of an intellectual black hole -- a view that rational agents must reject in order to preserve their capacity for rationality.  But
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I've previously cited epistemic nihilism as an example of an intellectual black hole -- a view that rational agents must reject in order to preserve their capacity for rationality.  But the normative nihilist might seek to avoid this implication by offering up a non-normative account of rationality (and epistemology more broadly). One could just stipulate a certain extensional account of "rationality" -- perhaps consisting in conformity to norms of parsimony, logical validity, certain inductive/abductive norms, etc. -- without requiring these norms to be backed by irreducibly normative properties, or to give rise to categorical "oughts".  This modest nihilist says, in effect, "Here are my recommendations if you wish to join me in the game of truth-seeking.  But if truth is not your goal, I have no grounds on which to criticize you."My main concern about this move is that it isn't clear how the nihilist can consistently regard her own preferred epistemic norms as. . .

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