The Moral Relevance of Non-Natural Properties

I've been thinking about the "ethical idlers" objection to non-naturalism recently, especially in light of Matt Bedke's really interesting forthcoming paper “A Menagerie of Duties?: Normative
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I've been thinking about the "ethical idlers" objection to non-naturalism recently, especially in light of Matt Bedke's really interesting forthcoming paper “A Menagerie of Duties?: Normative Judgments are not Beliefs about Non-Natural Properties”.  As Bedke introduces the problem:What things are like non-naturally is not relevant to our normative judgments in the way we would expect them to be if such judgments were beliefs about those sorts of properties. Non-natural properties would belong to a menagerie of curiosities if we could map and catalog them, but our deepest normative convictions do not hang on how they are arranged.Or, as Frank Jackson put it (From Metaphysics to Ethics, p.127):[I]t is hard to see how the further properties [posited by non-naturalists] could be of any ethical significance. Are we supposed to take seriously someone who says, 'I see that this action will kill many and save no-one, but that is not enough to justify my not doing it; what really. . .

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