In this series of articles, I analyze the seemingly intractable “Gettier Problem” which is a supposed counter-example to the standard view that knowledge consists of justified, true, belief. I will argue that most, if not all Gettier cases do not adequately account for the belief component and all that this element entails when attempting to appeal to our intuitions about why the case is not an instance of knowledge. If belief is adequately accounted for, the cases lose their intuitive force.
Part 1 – Gettier – What’s the Problem?
Part 2 – A Brief Remark on Intuitions and Gettier Cases
Part 3—Which Condition Isn’t Met?
Part 4—Shope’s Analysis
Part 5—Definite Descriptions and the Gettier Example
Part 6—The Object of Belief
Part 7—Reference and Meaning
Part 8—States of affairs as distinct from propositions
Part 9—Propositions and their relationship to states of affairs