The Two Selves: Their Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence

2014.08.32 : View this Review Online | View Recent NDPR Reviews Stanley B. Klein, The Two Selves: Their Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence, Oxford University Press, 2014,
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2014.08.32 : View this Review Online | View Recent NDPR Reviews Stanley B. Klein, The Two Selves: Their Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence, Oxford University Press, 2014, 153pp., $35.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780199349968. Reviewed by John Barresi, Dalhousie University At the center of William James's masterpiece, The Principles of Psychology (1890), are his chapters on the stream of consciousness and the self. He tackled these topics primarily from an experiential or phenomenological perspective, but connected them to the rising science of the brain. He didn't know how things would turn out in the end, but he insisted that the new science of psychology must never lose sight of the fact that understanding immediate experience must be at the center of its explanatory endeavors. In this work he struggled to avoid making metaphysical assumptions, particularly about how immediate experience might be grounded, not only in the material, but also in a spiritual realm.. . .

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News source: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // News

Time machine fiction

The perils of time-travel fiction. To draw a moral from the past can be pompous; to visit the future to warn about the present can be patronizing…
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The perils of time-travel fiction. To draw a moral from the past can be pompous; to visit the future to warn about the present can be patronizing… more»

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News source: Arts & Letters Daily

What’s going on

Society, politics, economics, culture; foreign and domestic; corporate and not-for-profit: The old categories are becoming obsolete…
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Society, politics, economics, culture; foreign and domestic; corporate and not-for-profit: The old categories are becoming obsolete… more»

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News source: Arts & Letters Daily

Modernism in Paris

Life in Montmartre for Picasso and Matisse was deep blues, green skies, and chaos–all scented with musk and patchouli…
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Life in Montmartre for Picasso and Matisse was deep blues, green skies, and chaos–all scented with musk and patchouli… more»

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News source: Arts & Letters Daily

The Death Penalty, Volume I

2014.08.31 : View this Review Online | View Recent NDPR Reviews Jacques Derrida, The Death Penalty, Volume I, Geoffrey Bennington, Marc Crépon, and Thomas Dutoit (eds.), Peggy Kamuf (tr.),
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2014.08.31 : View this Review Online | View Recent NDPR Reviews Jacques Derrida, The Death Penalty, Volume I, Geoffrey Bennington, Marc Crépon, and Thomas Dutoit (eds.), Peggy Kamuf (tr.), University of Chicago Press, 2014, 287pp., $35.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780226144320. Reviewed by Björn Thorsteinsson, University of Iceland Jacques Derrida's lectures on the death penalty were given at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales in Paris during the academic years 1999-2000 and 2000-2001. As explained in the Editorial Note to this English translation, they formed a part of Derrida's weekly seminar at the École, which ran for fourteen years under the general heading of "Questions of Responsibility". The last section of the seminar, dealing with issues of "The Beast and the Sovereign", has already been published in both French and English (and reviewed in this journal). The book under review here contains the first part of the section on the death penalty, with the second. . .

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News source: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // News

Question about Knowledge - Charles Taliaferro responds

I want ask about our trust to others, how we can thoroughly trust to others? How we know that we trust to right people? Why we must trust to others and what impact if we hard to give a trust to
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I want ask about our trust to others, how we can thoroughly trust to others? How we know that we trust to right people? Why we must trust to others and what impact if we hard to give a trust to others? Response from: Charles Taliaferro The topic of trust is very, very important on all sorts of levels, from everyday exchanges, to contributing to this website, to ordering food at a restaurant, signing a loan to buy a car....In fact, it may be that TRUST of some kind, even if it is the minimal sense of having to trust your own thinking, may play an important role in virtually all our waking hours. I will put to one side whether there is trust in dreams! First consider a few observations about what is trust...At least in English, the word trust may be used widely; I might trust my computer to work, trust that it will not rain when I have to work with the homeless this afternoon as part of a charity project, and so on, but I suggest that its principle use is in terms of persons. In. . .

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News source: AskPhilosophers.org | "All"

Question about Logic - Charles Taliaferro responds

Someone deliberately advances a fallacious argument in an attempt to advance a cause she considers just. For example, she may treat contraries as if they are contradictories and thus commit a
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Someone deliberately advances a fallacious argument in an attempt to advance a cause she considers just. For example, she may treat contraries as if they are contradictories and thus commit a fallacy of false alternatives. Are there any living philosophers who defend the use of "noble fallacies" or "noble fallacious arguments" (and is there a better term for this kind of thing)? And are there any contemporary philosophers who criticize or condemn the practice, including when it is practiced by people who are on "their side" regarding social and political issues? Response from: Charles Taliaferro Fascinating inquiry! I do not recall articles or books explicitly on when it is good to commit fallacies, but you might find of interest the literature on the ethics of lying. There is a great deal of philosophical work on when, if ever, it is permissible to lie, and this probably would include work on when it is permissible to deliberately engage in fallacious resigning. One primary. . .

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Question about Emotion, Knowledge - Stephen Maitzen responds

Is it possible for someone to produce knowledge simply based on reason alone, without any emotion? Response from: Stephen Maitzen I see no reason, in principle, why not. If knowledge were not
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Is it possible for someone to produce knowledge simply based on reason alone, without any emotion? Response from: Stephen Maitzen I see no reason, in principle, why not. If knowledge were not possible without emotion, then no emotionless computer could achieve knowledge, which would come as a shock to the proponents of artificial intelligence (AI). Nor do I see anything in the concept of knowledge itself that rules out knowledge based on reason alone without any emotional content or associations. I don't mean to say that emotion can't play an essential role in some kinds of knowledge, only that I can't see how emotion would be essential to every kind of knowledge.

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Question about Logic, Space, Time - Stephen Maitzen responds

Have Zeno's paradoxes of motion actually been satisfactorily solved? Physicists and mathematicians I've read on the matter seem to regard them as no longer important, but never explain convincingly
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Have Zeno's paradoxes of motion actually been satisfactorily solved? Physicists and mathematicians I've read on the matter seem to regard them as no longer important, but never explain convincingly (for my money) why they're not still important. Have philosophers said anything interesting about them recently? Could you either succinctly explain how they've been solved or point me in the direction of good recent discussions? Response from: Stephen Maitzen I recommend starting with the SEP entry on the topic, available here.There's an article not cited by the entry that may be relevant because it takes a skeptical view of the standardly accepted solution to one of the paradoxes: "Zeno's Metrical Paradox Revisited," by David M. Sherry, Philosophy of Science 55 (1988), 58-73._

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Evil and Hiddenness – Brief meditation

Thesis 1: The problem of divine hiddenness is, in some reasonable sense, a “deeper” problem than the problem of evil. Datum 1: If God were vividly present to us, we could suffer almost
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Thesis 1: The problem of divine hiddenness is, in some reasonable sense, a “deeper” problem than the problem of evil. Datum 1: If God were vividly present to us, we could suffer almost anything–at least the kinds of things we find on this planet–without (evidential) doubt that God exists (and also with little emotional doubt).…

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News source: The Prosblogion