Symbol for assignment of a truth-value?

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Here’s an odd thing. There seems, browsing along my shelves, to be no standard symbolic metalinguistic shorthand for assigning a truth-value to a wff (say, in the propositional calculus). You would have expected there to be some. In the first edition of my Introduction to Formal Logic, I borrowed the symbol ‘‘ to abbreviate ‘has the value … [on some given valuation]’ and wrote the likes of e.g. If and  then . But on reflection this was silly, given that the symbol ‘‘ is already overloaded (not in my book, but elsewhere — like on math.stackexchange! — where, for a start, some use it for the conditional, some use it in place of a turnstile, and some get in a tangle by using it ambiguously for both!). It seems wiser not to add to possible confusion, especially when readers might well simultaneously get to see the double arrow being used in one of these different ways. So for the upcoming second edition, I’m now minded to. . .

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News source: Logic Matters

Philosophy: Eternal topics, evolving questions

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Philosophers are famous for disagreeing on the issues that interest them. Is morality objective? Is the mind identical to the body? Are our actions free or determined? Some professional philosophers will say no to these questions—but an almost equal number will say yes. Moreover, empirical data bears this out. In a widely publicized PhilPapers survey, conducted by David Bourget and David Chalmers, little or no consensus was found among contemporary philosophers on key philosophical theses. In the face of all this, does philosophy make progress? Surely the question answers itself. If philosophers can’t agree on their answers, the inevitable conclusion is: they make no progress. Or, at least, they make no progress, except on the meta-question of whether there is progress. On this there can be no disagreement. But philosophers disagree on the meta-question, too! A recent exchange in the Times Literary Supplement will give you the flavour: On the optimistic side, David Papineau, a. . .

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News source: OUPblog » Philosophy

Descartes' Modal Metaphysics

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[Revised entry by David Cunning on January 12, 2018. Changes to: Main text, Bibliography] Descartes sometimes speaks of things that have possible existence, in addition to speaking of things as having actual existence. He also speaks of eternal and necessary truths that are the product of God's free and wholly unconstrained activity. One of the interpretive projects that is inspired by Descartes' sometimes provocative claims about possibility and necessity is the construction of a general Cartesian theory of modality. Any such theory would of course need to be sensitive to all of the claims that Descartes makes...

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News source: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Excessive Subjectivity: Kant, Hegel, Lacan, and the Foundations of Ethics

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2018.01.05 : View this Review Online | View Recent NDPR Reviews Dominik Finkelde, Excessive Subjectivity -- Kant, Hegel, Lacan, and the Foundations of Ethics, Deva Kemmis and Astrid Weigert (trs.), Columbia University Press, 2017, 340pp., $65.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780231173186. Reviewed by Klas Roth, Stockholm University Dominik Finkelde argues that "there are no 'excessive subjects' but only 'excessive subjectivity'" (76). The latter is, for him, a structural force "that breaks with the context of established ethical life" (5) and cannot be assimilated, either with "the Kantian/formalistic [sense of excessive subjects] nor . . . the Hegelian/pragmatic tradition of ethics" (5). In his opinion it exceeds their work, and is on "a more solid footing" (6) with psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan's work, which in turn is inspired by the work of Kant and Hegel. Finkelde also believes that representatives of excessive subjectivity make change possible, and that an apostle of excessive. . .

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News source: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // News