Chomsky and Moral Philosophy

Some experimental philosophers might be interested in "Chomsky and Moral Philosophy," a new paper I recently posted on SSRN. It will appear in the second edition of The Cambridge Companion to
Some experimental philosophers might be interested in "Chomsky and Moral Philosophy," a new paper I recently posted on SSRN. It will appear in the second edition of The Cambridge Companion to [More]

Lost in the museum

You go to the museum. Stand in line for half an hour. Pay 20 bucks. And then, you’re there, looking at the exhibited artworks, but you get nothing out of it. You try hard. You read the little
You go to the museum. Stand in line for half an hour. Pay 20 bucks. And then, you’re there, looking at the exhibited artworks, but you get nothing out of it. You try hard. You read the little [More]

Imagining zombies

Understanding the relationship between the mind and the body remains one of the most vexed problems in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience. Physicalism has not reigned unchallenged,
Understanding the relationship between the mind and the body remains one of the most vexed problems in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience. Physicalism has not reigned unchallenged, [More]

What should we be teaching in philosophy of mind courses?

Should we focus exclusively on the topics that dominated the philosophical study of mind in the 20th Century (dualism, functionalism, etc.)? Or should we also be teaching students about the kinds of
Should we focus exclusively on the topics that dominated the philosophical study of mind in the 20th Century (dualism, functionalism, etc.)? Or should we also be teaching students about the kinds of [More]

Knobe in the NYT

Our own Joshua Knobe has an interesting piece on theory of mind and corporations that just appeared in The New York Times entitled, "Do Corporations Have Minds?" He reports some interesting findings
Our own Joshua Knobe has an interesting piece on theory of mind and corporations that just appeared in The New York Times entitled, "Do Corporations Have Minds?" He reports some interesting findings [More]

Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy

I am happy to announce a forthcoming new volume from the Blackwell Companions to Philosophy Series: A Companion to Experimental Philosophy. It is edited by Justin Sytsma and myself and features over
I am happy to announce a forthcoming new volume from the Blackwell Companions to Philosophy Series: A Companion to Experimental Philosophy. It is edited by Justin Sytsma and myself and features over [More]

IAI Debate: Secrets of the Mind

Many philosophers hold that the essence of consciousness is the first person experience of being a conscious being, a phenomenon irreducible to any third-person analysis. Others demur. On which side do you fall?
Many philosophers hold that the essence of consciousness is the first person experience of being a conscious being, a phenomenon irreducible to any third-person analysis. Others demur. On which side do you fall? [More]

Duke's Summer Seminars in Neuroscience and Philosophy

The Duke Philosophy Department is pleased to announce that professors Felipe De Brigard and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong have received a $1.8 million dollar grant from the John Templeton Foundation to
The Duke Philosophy Department is pleased to announce that professors Felipe De Brigard and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong have received a $1.8 million dollar grant from the John Templeton Foundation to [More]

Sytsma and Arico on Philosophy TV

Justin Sytsma and Adam Arico discuss phenomenal consciousness, folk intuitions, and experimental philosophy more generally for the latest episode of Philosophy TV. They focus on some issues that are
Justin Sytsma and Adam Arico discuss phenomenal consciousness, folk intuitions, and experimental philosophy more generally for the latest episode of Philosophy TV. They focus on some issues that are [More]

The Daily Owl 8-28-2013

“What I want to insist on, ceaselessly, is that one can accept the obvious facts of physics—for example, that the world is made up entirely of physical particles in fields of force—without at the same time denying the obvious facts about our own experiences—for example, that we all are conscious and that our conscious states have quite irreducible phenomenological properties. ” [More]