Virtual Colloquium: Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne, and Yoaav Isaacs, “Evil and Evidence”

It’s Friday again, and time for the Prosblogion Virtual Colloquium! A brief administrative note: there will be no colloquium next week (November 25) due to the American Thanksgiving holiday.
It’s Friday again, and time for the Prosblogion Virtual Colloquium! A brief administrative note: there will be no colloquium next week (November 25) due to the American Thanksgiving holiday. [More]

Philosophers and their religious practices: Part 25, A personal connection with God

This is the twenty-fifth installment of a series of interviews I am conducting with academic philosophers about their religious practices. In this series of interviews, I ask philosophers about
This is the twenty-fifth installment of a series of interviews I am conducting with academic philosophers about their religious practices. In this series of interviews, I ask philosophers about [More]

In Memoriam: William L. Rowe (1931-2015)

Paul Draper shares the following: It is with great sadness that I inform you that my friend, William Rowe, died this morning (August 22nd, 2015). As most of you know, he was a philosopher of
Paul Draper shares the following: It is with great sadness that I inform you that my friend, William Rowe, died this morning (August 22nd, 2015). As most of you know, he was a philosopher of [More]

Philosophers and their religious practices part 11: The Wesley experience

This is the eleventh installment of a series of interviews I am conducting with academic philosophers about their religious practices. In this series of interviews, I ask philosophers about their
This is the eleventh installment of a series of interviews I am conducting with academic philosophers about their religious practices. In this series of interviews, I ask philosophers about their [More]

Theism, Axiarchism and Restricted Actuality

Guleserian (1983) presents a version of the Problem of Evil that attacks the conjunction of theism and modal realism. Like the traditional Problem of Evil, Guleserian’s argument begins with a
Guleserian (1983) presents a version of the Problem of Evil that attacks the conjunction of theism and modal realism. Like the traditional Problem of Evil, Guleserian’s argument begins with a [More]

Theism, axiarchism, and restricted actuality

Guleserian (1983) presents a version of the Problem of Evil that attacks the conjunction of theism and modal realism. Like the traditional Problem of Evil, Guleserian’s argument begins with a
Guleserian (1983) presents a version of the Problem of Evil that attacks the conjunction of theism and modal realism. Like the traditional Problem of Evil, Guleserian’s argument begins with a [More]

Can atheism be properly basic?

I’ve recently been wondering whether atheism – the belief that God does not exist – could be properly basic. By that, I mean whether it could be a belief that is not based on arguments, but
I’ve recently been wondering whether atheism – the belief that God does not exist – could be properly basic. By that, I mean whether it could be a belief that is not based on arguments, but [More]

Are Eternalist Worlds Too Valuable?

Suppose for the sake of discussion that (1) is true. I have no idea whether there are worlds in which there are just 100 happy people, but it does simplify the discussion. 1. w includes 100 happy
Suppose for the sake of discussion that (1) is true. I have no idea whether there are worlds in which there are just 100 happy people, but it does simplify the discussion. 1. w includes 100 happy [More]

Are Eternalist Worlds are Too Valuable?

Let a possible world w include 100 happy people that exist for 10 minutes and then cease existing. 1. w includes 100 happy people existing for 10 minutes only. The value of w, I think, is ten times
Let a possible world w include 100 happy people that exist for 10 minutes and then cease existing. 1. w includes 100 happy people existing for 10 minutes only. The value of w, I think, is ten times [More]

Subtraction and Impossible Objects

Subtraction arguments begin with the modest assumption that there are worlds that do not include more than a finite number of concrete (or concrete*) objects. Each of these concrete objects has the
Subtraction arguments begin with the modest assumption that there are worlds that do not include more than a finite number of concrete (or concrete*) objects. Each of these concrete objects has the [More]